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THE REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING IN JAPAN:
INTRODUCING A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Insider trading involves the sale or purchase of securities while in
possession of material, non-public information.! Due to the large sums of
money often involved, the incentives to trade on inside information are
great.' Therefore, effective regulation is essential to the deterrence of
insider trading. Such regulation helps ensure a fair and efficient market in
which investors may invest more securely, without the fear of fraud or
other market abuses.3 Recent years have witnessed a growth in the amount
and severity of insider trading regulations worldwide.4
In Japan, recent stock trading scandals and international pressure have
also led to a tightening of insider trading regulations.5 The Securities
I. This is the common definition used by most scholars, courts and attorneys. See, e.g., DONALD
C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING: REGULATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND PREVENTION § 1.01 (1994).
2. Perhaps the most famous case of insider trading in the United States involved arbitrageur Ivan
Boesky, who earned a reported $80 million from illegally trading on inside information that he received
from investment banker, Dennis Levine. See James Stermgold, Boesky Sentenced to 3 Years in Jail in
Insider Scandal, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 1987, at Al. Boesky settled civil charges by agreeing to pay
$100 million in damages. After cooperating with authorities, he was sentenced to three years in prison
and fined $250,000. SEC v. Boeksy, No. 11288, 1986 WL 15283 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1986).
3. Inadequately regulated markets may be costly in terms of both number of investors and share
prices. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Regulatory Competition in Securities Markets: An Approach for
Reconciling Japanese and United States Disclosure Philosophies, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
149 (1993) (suggesting a framework for regulatory enforcement negotiations between Japan and the
United States). Cox writes that "[C]ountries with lax regulations will be seen as a modem day Barbary
Coast to which some investors will be unwilling to launch their investment." Id. at 157. Securities in
regulated markets will also realize higher trading prices because those "which enjoy an overall lower
likelihood of abusive practices will ex ante trade at prices slightly higher than those of less regulated
markets." Id. at 158. Some analysts have taken issue with the idea that insider trading results in
inefficient markets. See infra note 15.
4. For an overview of regulatory actions affecting insider trading worldwide, see generally
INSIDER TRADING: THE LAWS OF EUROPE, THE UNIrED STATES AND JAPAN (Emmanuel Gaillard ed.,
1992).
5. In 1991, Japan's big four securities firms (Daiwa, Nikko, Nomura, and Yamaichi) compensated
certain investors for losses sustained in securities transactions. Some of this compensation was actually
tied to organized crime figures. The scandal escalated when the media reported that members of the
Ministry of Finance had known and approved of the scheme. The Minister of Finance resigned over the
matter, As a punishment, the Ministry of Finance ordered each of the firms to suspend activities for four
days. The lenient punishment imposed upon these companies induced outrage, both in and outside of
Japan. For a commentary on the regulatory response to these scandals, see C. Jeffrey Char, Reforming
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Fairness Law of 19926 revised several regulations and created a market
watchdog, the Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC).'
As an arm of the powerful Ministry of Finance,8 the commission is far
from the equivalent of the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in either manpower or scope of activities.9 Despite
these shortcomings, the SESC could prove an effective instrument for
curbing some market abuses."
Japan's Securities Markets: The Loss Compensation Scandal, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw. 173 (1993);
David B. Hoppe, Note, Reform and Resistance, East and West: Regulators Respond to Financial
Scandal in Japan and the United States, 24 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 181 (1992); Masahisa Ikeda, The
Legality of Compensating Investors in the Japanese Securities Market-An Examination of the 1991
Amendments to the Japanese Securities and Exchange Law, 33 HARv. INT'L L.J 592 (1993). The
judiciary's response was also noteworthy. In a civil action, the Tokyo District Court found no violation,
The existing law only prohibited promises of loss compensation used to solicit customers. Thus, the
actual compensation was not illegal. Judgment of September 16, 1993 (Ikenanaka v. Tabuchi), Tokyo
Chisai, (translated by Curtis J. Milhaupt). For an account of the judiciary's response, see Seiji Tanaka,
The Banking and Securities Scandals and Fundamental Theories of Commercial Jursprudence,'l PAC.
RIM L. & POL'Y J. 349 (Yutaka Nakamura trans. 1993) (finding fault with the ruling and emphasizing
the need for corporate responsibility in maintaining trust in the international community).
6. Shokentorihiki tono Kosei o Kakuhosuru Tame no Shokentorihikiho tono Ichibu o Kaiseisuru
Horitsu [Law to Partially Amend the Securities and Exchange Law and Other Laws to Ensure the
Fairness of Securities and Other Transactions], Law No. 73 of 1992 [Securities Fairness Law].
7. Shokentorihiki to Kanshi Iinkai (Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission], Law No.
73 of 1992.
8. The Ministry of Finance is widely considered the most powerful member of the Japanese
bureaucracy. For a history of the Ministry of Finance and an analysis of its regulatory powers over the
securities industry, see Curtis J. Milhaupt, Managing the Market: The Ministry of Finance and
Securities Regulation in Japan, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L. 423 (1994). Professor Milhaupt notes that the
"[Ministry of Finance] is perceived, both by itself and by the public, as the nation's most elite civil
service, as guardian of the nation's economic health, and as a breeding ground for prime ministers - in
short, as the pinnacle of the Japanese state." Id. at 444.
9. The SESC is composed of approximately 200 members, one thirteenth the size of the SEC.
Id. at 470. It has the power to investigate illegal activities, but it cannot bring actions independently.
Id. at 470-71. Rather, it is empowered to make recommendations to the Ministry of Finance, which then
decides whether to prosecute. Id. The Commission was established under Article 8 of the National
Government Organization Law. Law No. 120 of 1948. See Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 469-70 n.216.
10. Thus far, the SESC has launched two investigations into alleged insider trading violations. The
first began in March of 1994 against employees of Nippon Shoji, employees of that company's sales
agent, and one individual investor. See 24 Fined for Insider Trading of Pharmaceutical Shares (24
Fined), Nuumi WKLY., Dec. 26, 1994, at 20, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nikkei File. A drug
produced by Nippon Shoji, a pharmaceutical company, caused the death of several consumers. Id. All
of the parties under investigation had sold stock in the company shortly before the damaging
information regarding the product became public. Id. In December of 1994, the Osaka summary court
found twenty four people guilty of insider trading and fined each of them between 200,000 and 500,000
yen ($2,000 - $5,000). Id. The SESC also launched an investigation of Shimizu Bank, whose chairman
admitted to insider trading of shares of Shin Kokusai Kokudo Kogyo, a construction company. See Bank
Focus ofInsider Trading Investigation, NIKKEi WVKLY., Dec. 12, 1994, at 19, available in LEXIS, News
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The 1992 Act did not, however, address the major stumbling block of
regulating illegal market practices. The problem rests not in the regulations
themselves, but in the limited methods available for their enforcement."
Specifically, the absence of a private right of action in the regulation of
insider trading leaves enforcement solely in the hands of the Ministry of
Finance, the organization charged with promoting the very industry which
it should regulate. t2 In order to protect the securities industry as a whole,
the Ministry usually caters to large firms associated with the national
interest. 3 This policy of protectionism traditionally excludes small and
foreign investors. 4 By failing to provide or even encourage a private right
of action, the Ministry of Finance effectively prevents these investors from
taking an active role in the regulation of the Japanese securities market.
This Note examines the development of the private right of action in
United States securities regulation and analyzes the effects of the absence
of such a right in Japan. Part II traces the development of insider trading
regulations in the United States and Japan. Part III explores enforcement
mechanisms in Japan and the history of the use of private actions in
general. Part IV examines the Securities Fairness Act and its probable
effect on insider trading in Japan. Part V proposes the institution of a
private right of action in order to properly ensure the enforcement of
Library, Nikkei File.
11. Enforcement of most laws in Japan is reserved almost entirely to government bureaucrats. See
infra notes 82-86 and accompanying text.
12. Whereas the SEC focuses on enforcement, the Ministry of Finance emphasizes its promotional
role Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 445. This promotional stance, often referred to as "industrial policy"
is the rule among Japanese bureaucracies and has been widely credited with Japan's post-war economic
success. See CHALMERS JoHNsON, MITI AND THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE (1982) (tracing the development
of Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) from pre-war until 1975); Robert Reich,
Why the US. Needs an Industrial Policy, 60 HARV. Bus. REv. 74 (1982).
13. This is not a phenomenon unique to the securities industry or the Ministry of Finance. MITI
is probably the most renowned ministry for using protectionist policies to develop Japanese industry.
See JOHNSON, supra note 12. One negative manifestation of this policy occurred when the Ministry of
Finance gave tacit approval to the securities firms that paid compensation to large investors. See supra
note 5.
14. See Nicole J. Ramsay, Note, Japanese Securities Regulation: Problems of Enforcement, 60
FORDHAM L. REv. 255 (1992) (analyzing the clamor for change in Japanese securities regulation after
the 1991 scandals and calling for an independent market watchdog). Ramsay explains that "Japan's
enforcement problems are clouded by Ministry officials' beliefs that the benefit of capital flow into the
domestic securities system outweighs the costs of bias against small investors." Id. at 277. A more
recent article suggests that the Ministry of Finance has actually injured small investors and profited by
floating stock prices in the privatization of several government enterprises. Roger Shiro, How Greedy
Bureaucrats Scalp Private Investors, TOKYO Bus. TODAY, Jan. 1995, § 3, at 17, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Tokbus File.
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Japanese securities regulations and effectively deter insider trading. A
private right could develop either through the efforts of private litigants and
the judiciary, or through bureaucratic or legislative implementation. The
introduction of civil liability for insider trading would boost investor
confidence and help to reinvigorate the troubled Japanese securities market.
II. THE HISTORY OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATION IN JAPAN AND
THE UNITED STATES
Although the merits of insider trading have been proclaimed in some
circles, 5 it is generally considered unfair and harmful to financial
markets. 6 In order to ensure the rights of the buying public, and as a
response to the financial scandals of the time, the U.S. Congress passed the
Securities Act of 1933'7 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(Exchange Act)." The latter included one section specifically designed to
eliminate insider trading, section 16(b), 9 and another general provision
which has evolved into the most important tool for curbing such activities,
section 10(b).2°
Japanese securities regulation relies upon the American model, with the
Securities Exchange Law of 1948 (SEL)2 based largely upon the
15. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND POLICY (1991)
(arguing that insider trading is neither unfair nor inefficient and that governments should not regulate
it); HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (arguing that insider trading
compensates managers and is economically beneficial); but see Roy Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price:
.A Reply to Manne, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425 (1967) (arguing against property rights theorists by noting that
insider trading would result in random and unpredictable compensation unrelated to corporate
performance or compensation programs).
16. The argument against insider trading is advanced by such luminaries as Professor Louis Loss.
See Louis Loss, The Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate Insiders in the United
States, 33 MODERN L. REV. 34, 36 (1970) (stressing insider trading's immorality and the importance
of an appearance of market equity to the general public). This argument has also been taken up in
Japan. See Takayasu Okushima & Nobuo Nakamura, An Act Partially Amending the Securities
Exchange Act, 9 WASEDA BuL. COM'. L. 17, 19-20 (1990) (stating that trading on inside information
"is an unfair transaction, comparable to a rigged horse-race, and it ruins the public's reliance on the
securities market"). One modem approach from the law and economics school argues that regulation
of insider trading reduces transaction costs and produces market liquidity. See Nicholas L.
Georgakopolous, Insider Trading as a Transactional Cost: A Market Microstructure Justification and
Optimalization of Insider Trading Regulation, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1993).
17. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988).
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-7811 (1988).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
21. Shokentorihikiho [Securities and Exchange Law], Law No. 25 of 1948, as amended through
1992 [hereinafter SEL], reprinted in Securities Exchange Law and Foreign Securities Firms Law of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss3/32
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Securities Act and the Exchange Act.' In fact, the language of articles 58
and 189 of the SEL parallels sections 10(b) and 16(b) of the Exchange
Act.23 However, while the U.S. securities market is generally considered
to be well regulated, the Japanese market has been widely criticized as
being an "insider haven."24 Notably, in the United States, approximately
300 actions are filed annually by the SEC alone.2" In Japan, only three
cases of insider trading have ever gone to trial.26
Japan, 1-162 (Christopher P. Wells ed., 1993) [hereinafter SEL & FSFL].
22. Japan adopted the U.S. acts almost in their entirety. Makoto Yazawa, A Synopsis of Securities
Regulation in Japan, in JAPANESE SECURITIES REGULATION, 24 (Louis Loss et al. eds., 1983).
23. It is helpful to note here that the insider trading provisions in Japan's SEL have been
recodified under different article numbers. In 1992, Articles 58 and 189 were redesignated as Articles
157 and 164. Law No. 73 of 1992. In addition, a 1988 amendment introduced two new provisions,
Articles 190-2 and 190-3 and reinstated the former Article 188 as Article 154. law to partially amend
the Securities and Exchange law, Law No. 75 of 1988. These articles were also recodified by the
Securities Fairness Law in 1992. Law No. 73 of 1992. Articles 190-2 and 190-3 became Articles 166
and 167 and Article 154 became Article 162. The following chart may clarify the number scheme and
serve as a reference. The American equivalents of the Japanese articles are included.
U.S. SEA Original SEL 1988 1992
Amendment Amendment
General Anti-Fraud 10(b) 58 58 157
Provision 10_)_5_5815
Short-Saving Provision 16(b) 189 189 164
Disclosure Requirement 16(a) 188 154 163
Specific Insider Trading 190-2 166
Provisions 190-3 167
24. Shen-Shin Lu, Are the 1988 Amendments to Japanese Securities Regulation Law Effective
Deterrents?, 1991 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 179, 194 (1991). In a similar vein, journalist James Stemgold
refers to Japan's market as a "rigged casino." James Sterngold, Japan's Rigged Casino, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 26, 1992, § 6, at 24. Shortly after the loss compensation scandal, another problem emerged. Daiwa,
one of the big four securities firms, conducted a scheme in which it sold securities to a prominent
customer for an amount well over the market price by promising to buy it back later. Id. The scheme,
called tobashi, or "flying" involves the repeated sale of the stock by Daiwa patrons at increasingly
higher prices. Id. When the market price becomes sufficiently inflated, Daiwa repurchases the stock and
reimburses the original buyer. Id. It can then resell the stock at an artificially high price. Id. If the plan
works Daiwa and each of its customers clears a profit. Id. Unfortunately for Daiwa, the plan failed
because of depression within the market, and the original customer, a large department store, alerted
the Ministry of Finance. Id.
25. Ramsay, supra note 14, at 262 n.64.
26. The first case brought to trial was the Shokusan Jutaku case. See infra note 71. After the 1988
Amendment, one insider trading case was decided. See Japanese Executive Found Guilty of Insider
Trading, WALL ST. J., Sept. 29, 1992, at A13. The former managing director of Macross Corporation
was found guilty of insider trading under Article 166 and fined 500,000 yen (about $5,000). Id. Article
166 was first introduced in 1988. See infra note 77. In another case, a finance firm official settled
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A. The Development of Insider Trading Regulation in the U.S.
Although insider trading is assumed to be among the vices addressed by
U.S. securities regulations, it is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the
1933 and 1934 Acts.27 Rather, Congress' enumerated goals included "full
and fair disclosure of the character of securities" and the prevention of
"frauds in the sale thereof."'28 Sections 16(b) and 10(b) were drafted to
meet these goals, and insider trading has effectively been prosecuted under
21both provisions. Officially, the SEC has the power to enforce these and
other securities regulations, 30 but the development of a private right of
action has been crucial to the deterrence of insider trading.
Section 16(b) requires that insiders return to the corporation any profits
gained through the purchase and sale of stock within a six month period.3
The law requires no showing of intent to profit.32 Rather, it simply calls
for the disgorgement of any profits made through transactions within this
time frame. 33 As the primary weapon against insider trading, this provi-
sion has obvious weaknesses. An insider waiting longer than six months to
sell is beyond the scope of section 16(b).34
without going to trial. Id. The Nippon Shoji affair is the most recent case. See supra note 10.
27. Insider trading was not, in fact, explicitly defined until 1988. Insider Trading and Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
28. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, Preamble (1933).
29. Section 10(b) has been the more effective weapon. See infra notes 35-45 and accompanying
text. Section 16(b) has not been invoked as frequently, but it is arguably a greater deterrent. Parties are
less willing to challenge § 16(b) because of its mechanical construction. See 5 ARNOLD S. JACOBS,
LIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RuLE 10B-5, § 3.02(g)(iii)(A) at 1-154.119 (1990).
30. 15 U.S.C. § 78c.
31. Section 16(b) reads:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained
by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any
profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity
security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than six
months.... shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on
the part of such beneficial, director, or officer ....
15 U.S.C. § 78p.
32. Id. This provision is enabled by § 16(a), which requires that corporate directors, officers, and
beneficial owners of ten percent or more of any equity security file a registration statement with the
SEC within ten days of becoming an owner, director or officer. Such parties are also required to file
a registration of any changes in these holdings. Id.
33. Id.
34. Kanji Ishizumi details this and other enforcement problems under Section 16(b) in an article
comparing the regulation of insider trading in Japan and the United States. Kanji Ishizumi, Insider
Trading Regulation: An Examination of Section 16(b) and a Proposal for Japan, 47 FoRDHAM L. REV.
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The scope of section 10(b) and its supplement, rule lOb-5,35 is not quite
so limited. Section 10(b) forbids the use of manipulative and deceptive
devices to defraud, but courts interpreted it to affect only the sale of
securities. 3' To curtail fraud in the purchase of securities, the SEC
instituted rule lOb-5 in 1942.37 Its development into a vast means of civil
liability has led to its characterization as "a judicial oak which has grown
from little more than an acorn. ' 38 Although its purpose has been ques-
tioned and its scope decried,39 rule lob-5 has proven to be the most
effective weapon against insider trading.40
While debate continues as to whether Congress intended to allow a
private right of action under section 10(b), it is clear from the language of
the provision that Congress did not explicitly provide for a private right of
action." Rather, the judiciary granted this right. In Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co.,42 the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
ruled that violating rule 1Ob-5 was a wrongful act and, as such, could
provide the wronged party with a private remedy. 43 The court recognized
that the legislature did not provide for a private right of action.' It held,
however, that civil liability in such situations is fundamental and is
therefore imputed unless explicitly denied by statute.45
449, 472-85 (1979).
35, Rule 1Ob-5, Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, Exch. Act Release No. 3230,
17 C F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
36 Section 10(b) reads:
It shall be unlawful ... to use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j.
37. 17 C.F.R. § 240.I0b-5.
38. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
39 Recently, some have argued against the use of the anti-fraud provision in private suits.
Legislators introduced bills in both the House and Senate in 1992 to restrict litigation under Rule lob-5.
See H.R. 5828, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992); S. 3181, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992). Professor Michael
Kaufman argues that the creation of the private right of action under Section 10(b) is an unconstitutional
creation of law and expansion of subject matter jurisdiction. Michael J. Kaufman, A Little "Right"
Musick The Unconstitutional Judicial Creation of Private Rights ofAction Under Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 287 (1994).
40. Jacobs, supra note 29, § 8.01, at 1-228.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
42. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
43. Id. at 513.
44. Id. at 514.
45. Id.
14051995]
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The private right of action for rule lOb-5 cases has been endorsed by the
SEC46 and addressed by the Supreme Court. In J.. Case Company v.
Borak,47 the Court ruled that a private right of action exists under section
14(a) of the Exchange Act.48 The Court held that because the Exchange
Act's primary goals included protection of investors, it was the Court's
duty to effectuate this purpose by providing for civil liability under the
Act.49 Other courts have used the Borak court's reasoning to imply a
private right of action under other sections of the Exchange Act, including
rule lOb-5. Almost twenty years after Borak, Justice Marshall recognized
the existence of a private right of action under rule lOb-5 as being settled
and "beyond peradventure."5
B. The SEL and Enforcement in Japan
The Japanese SEL was among the laws that the Supreme Commander of
Allied Powers imposed during the post-war occupation." As such, it was
not propelled by the kind of anti-Wall Street populism present in Washing-
ton during the early 1930s.2 Soon after the American occupation, the
46. As David Ruder has noted, the SEC proved instrumental in the development of a private right
of action under section 10(b), filing amicus briefs in Kardon and many subsequent circuit court cases.
David S. Ruder, The Development of Legal Doctrine Through Amicus Participation: The SEC
Experience, 1989 VIs. L. REV. 1167, 1172-75 (1989). The SEC first applied section 10(b) and rule lOb-
5 to trading on inside information in 1961. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). Chairman
Cary ruled that "anti-fraud provisions are not intended as a specification of particular acts or practices
which constitute fraud, but rather are designed to encompass the infinite variety of devices by which
undue advantage may be taken of investors and others." Id. at 911.
47. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
48. Id. at 430-31. Section 14(a) makes unlawful the use of false or misleading proxy statements.
15 U.S.C. § 78n.
49. 377 U.S. at 432.
50. Herman & McLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983). Justice White further supported
the idea in 1988, stating that "judicial interpretation and application, legislative acquiescence, and the
passage of time have removed any doubt that a private cause of action exists for a violation of section
10(b) and rule 10b-5, and constitutes an essential tool for the enforcement of the 1934 Act's
requirements." Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 230-31 (1988).
51. The first Supreme Commander of Allied Powers in post-war Japan was General Douglas
MacArthur. SCAP is the name generally used to refer to the group headed by MacArthur which sought
to rebuild Japan along democratic lines from 1945 until 1952. See generally KYoKO INOUE,
MAcARTHUR's JAPANESE CONSTITUTION (1991). Japan has retained most of the laws imposed by
SCAP, although they have been selectively implemented. For a variety of views on SCAP from both
American and Japanese scholars, see DEMOCRATIZING JAPAN: THE ALLIED OCCUPATION (Robert E.
Ward & Sakamoto Yoshikazu eds., 1987).
52. The Securities Act and the Exchange Act were enacted in response to the speculative and often
deceptive practices which caused the crash of the stock market in 1929, triggering the Great Depression.
For a background on this reform movement, see MICHAEL E. PARRISH, SECURmiES REGULATION AND
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss3/32
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Japanese government was able to ignore or remove those provisions it
deemed unnecessary. 53 Consequently, administrative enforcement of
insider trading regulations developed slowly, and private enforcement was
stillborn.
4
Although Japanese regulation of insider trading has begun to tighten in
recent years, Japan does not share the historic American aversion toward
the activity." Commentators have elaborated on the value government and
industry leaders place upon inside information as a conduit for establishing
valuable relationships.56 Perceptions aside, it is clear that enforcement of
the regulations affecting insider trading did not begin in earnest until after
the internationalization of Japan's markets in the 1980s.57 Prior to 1988,
the Ministry of Finance routinely ignored fraudulent activities and the legal
mechanisms drafted to prevent them.55 The Ministry of Finance simply
removed from the SEL those provisions it considered potentially burden-
some.
59
Two aspects vital to regulation in the United States quickly disappeared
in Japan: the Japanese Securities and Exchange Commission (JSEC) and
the disclosure requirement of article 188, the equivalent of section 16(a) of
THE NEW DEAL (1970).
53. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
54. Only one case was prosecuted prior to 1988, and it took thirteen years to be resolved. See infra
note 71.
55. Misao Tatsuta, Proxy Regulations, Tender Offers, and Insider Trading, in JAPANESE
SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 22, at 159-95. Tatsuta wrote that "Although insider trading is
generally condemned in the United States, and although U.S. cases imposing civil liability for such
trading have drawn attention in Japanese business circles, most Japanese do not believe that insider
trading is immoral." Id. at 191-92.
56. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Insider Trading, The Japanese Way, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1988,
at DI (citing several anonymous sources who attest to the ubiquity of insider trading in the Japanese
market). Sanger explains that "[b]uying and selling shares based on advance information is a time-
honored tradition to cement relationships between brokers and their biggest clients." Id. Professor
Ramseyer claims that insider trading is built into the structure of Japan's corporate environment. J. Mark
Ramseyer, Columbian Cartel Launches BidsforJapanese Firms, 102 YALE L.J 2005 (1993). Ramseyer
asserts that Japanese banks buy stock in client companies in order to capitalize on inside information
they have already gained through credit investigations of those clients. Id. at 2013.
57. The number of foreign firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange more than quadrupled
between 1985 and 1987. See Lu, supra note 24, at 193.
58 Because only one suit was brought prior to 1988, it appears that the Ministry of Finance did
not place priority on the punishment and prevention of insider trading. Larry Zoglin asserts that this
results from limited resources and a focus of these resources on the larger problem of market
manipulation. Larry Zoglin, Insider Trading in Japan: A Challenge to the Integration of the Japanese
Equity Market into the Global Securities Market, 1987 COLuM. Bus. L. REv. 419, 421-22 (1987).
59. See infra notes 60-68 and accompanying text.
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the Exchange Act.6" The removal of the independent JSEC in 19526" left
enforcement solely in the hands of the Ministry of Finance, 62 an organiza-
tion disinclined to impose restrictions on an industry whose mission it was
to rebuild.63 The JSEC's powers were delegated internally to the Securities
Bureau of the Ministry of Finance." The Ministry also decided that the
Bureau's staff was underequipped to deal with the volume of information
being supplied as required under article 188.6' Thus, the ministry removed
article 188 one year later.6 Without a duty to report, the monitoring of
short-swing activity became difficult and article 189, Japan's version of
section 16(b),67 became ineffective.68
The Ministry of Finance's non-use of article 5869 has proven even more
60. Article 188 required the filing of registration statements with the Ministry of Finance. It has
since been reinstated as Article 162. See SEL & FSFL, supra note 21, at 103-04.
61. Law No. 270 of 1952.
62. Dealers associations and stock exchanges are theoretically required to oversee the operations
of securities dealers and provide punishments under SEL Articles 79-6 and 98, respectively. SEL, arts.
79-6, 98, reprinted in SEL & FSFL, supra note 21, at 76, 84. However, these parties have not played
a significant role in enforcing regulations. See Yazawa, supra note 21, at 25-26. The Tokyo Stock
Exchange has issued statements to firms regarding alleged insider trading activities, but did not punish
the parties involved. BARRY ALEXANDER K. RIDER & H. LEIGH FFRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER
TRADING 362-63 (1979). For an example of regulatory failure by the Tokyo Stock Exchange, see infra
note 81.
63. Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 444.
64. The Securities Bureau is one of seven bureaus within the Ministry of Finance. Id. at 446. It
is also the second smallest and has historically been regarded as less important than the Banking Bureau
within the financial arena. Id. at 447.
65. See Lu, supra note 24, at 190 n.43.
66. Law No. 142 of 1953.
67. Part one of article 189 read:
To prevent any officer or major shareholder of a listed company from improperly using
confidential information acquired through their duties or status, if such person realizes at the
person's own account through sale of Specified Securities, Etc., of the said Listed Company,
Etc., within six (6) months after his/her purchase of the same, or through purchase within six
(6) months after sale of the same, the said Listed Company, Etc. may demand that such
person tender the said profits to the said Listed Company, Etc.
SEL, art. 189(1), (recodified at art. 164(1)), reprinted in SEL & FSFL, supra note 21, at 104.
68. Because of the removal of article 188, only one case was ever brought under old article 189.
See infra note 71. Just as under section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, an insider may also avoid liability
by waiting longer than six months between transactions. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
Nihon Netsugaku, a Japanese corporation which allegedly participated in insider trading was able to
avoid liability under article 189 for precisely this reason. For a discussion of this case, see Katsuro
Kanzaki, Legal Analysis of the Nihon Netsugaku Case, I1 KOBE L. REv. 21 (1977).
69. See supra note 23. Article 58 read:
No person shall commit an act set forth in the following items:
(1) To employ any fraudulent device, scheme or artifice with respect to buying, selling or
other transactions of securities.
(2) To obtain money or other property by using documents of by any representation which
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss3/32
1995] INSIDER TRADING IN JAPAN 1409
detrimental to insider trading regulation than the removal of article 188 and
the JSEC. While the U.S. anti-fraud provision, section 10(b), became the
most effective weapon against insider trading, the Ministry of Finance
considered its equivalent, article 58, "too vague" to apply.7" Without
article 58, insider trading was virtually unpunishable for many years. In
fact, only one case was prosecuted before the 1988 Amendment to the
SEL.7'
C. Recent Legislation
During the 1980s, both the United States and Japan enacted measures
aimed at insider trading. In the United States, the Insider Trading Sanctions
Act of 198472 set massive penalties for violations,73 while the Insider
Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 codified certain
private rights and established mandatory "Chinese walls" between the
underwriting and trading departments of investment banks.74 Japan also
contain an untrue statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact
necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.
(3) To make use of false quotation for the purpose to solicit buying, selling or other
transactions of securities.
SEL, art. 58, reprinted in JAPANESE SEcuRrTIEs REGULATION, supra note 22, at 266. The Securities
Fairness Law recodified article 58 as article 157. Law No. 73 of 1992. See supra note 23. Some
modifications have been made. SEL, art. 157, reprinted in SEL & FSFL, supra note 21, at 100.
70. Kanzaki, supra note 68, at 27. Old article 58 was applied in one case, but the case did not
involve insider trading. See Tomoko Akashi, Note, Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan, 89 COLUM.
L. REv. 1296, 1298 n.14 (1989) (citing Judgment of July 10, 1963 Tokyo Kosai (Tokyo High Court)
14-7 Tokyo Keijiho 116, aff'd, Judgment of May 25, 1965, Saikosai (Supreme Court), 155 Saiko
Saibansho Saibanshu Keiji 831).
7 1. In the Shokusan Jutaku Case, the company's president made a profit of over one billion yen
by selling company shares within three months of purchasing them. See Lu, supra note 24, at 191-92.
A suit was brought under article 189, now codified as article 164 in a Tokyo District Court in 1974.
Id It was settled in 1987. Id.
72. Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
73. Under the new laws, civil liability for insider trading may include disgorgement of profits plus
three times the profit gained or loss avoided. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-l(a(3)). However, the treble damage
provision applies only to commission actions, not to private actions. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). The 1988 act
also increased the maximum criminal fine for insider trading from $100,000 to $1,000,000. 1d. The
maximum prison sentence was also increased from five to ten years. Id.
74. Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677. "Chinese walls" prevent insider trading by physically
separating employees, thus denying them access to any inside information. Many American corporations
have voluntarily established such barriers for some time. It is notable that in Japan, until recently, the
underwriters and traders often worked together and could sometimes be the same person. See Winifred
Swan, Note, The 1988 Japanese Insider Trading Amendments: Will Japan See Results from These
Tougher Laws?, 12 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 275, 297-98 (1991).
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enacted legislation.' In 1988, the government reinstated the disclosure
requirement of the former article 188 in a new provision, codified as article
154.76 The government also explicitly prohibited insider trading for the
first time through articles 190-2 and 190-3."
Although both nations followed the worldwide trend toward increased
insider trading legislation,78 even a cursory examination of the Acts
reveals a wide gap in effect, especially in the area of deterrence. While the
U.S. laws act to, both prevent violations and threaten violators with
increased penalties,79 the Japanese amendments simply provide the Ministry
of Finance with the opportunity to enforce existing regulations.8" Because
the Ministry had never strenuously acted upon these regulations in the first
place, the deterrent effect of the amendments was questionable and
enthusiasm for them was somewhat limited."' Furthermore, the establish-
75. Law No. 75 of 1988. The Diet, Japan's Legislative Body, further amended the SEL in 1990.
Act to Partially Amend the Securities and Exchange Law, Law No. 43 of 1990. The 1990 act did not
significantly affect insider trading. Rather, it introduced a system for disclosure of share ownership,
revised procedures for tender offers, and encouraged cooperation between the Ministry of Finance and
foreign regulatory bodies. Id. For a review and analysis of the 1990 amendment, see Atsuko Hirose,
Recent Development, Changes in Japanese Securities Law-Act to Partially Amend the Securities and
Exchange Law, Law No. 43 of 1990 (June 22, 1990), 32 HARv. INT'L L. J. 508 (1991).
76. See supra note 23.
77. Law No. 73 of 1992. Article 190-3, which was recodified as article 166 prohibits the purchase
or sale of securities by any person aware of any material fact before the fact is publicly announced.
SEL, art. 166, reprinted in SEL & FSFL, supra note 21, at 106-09. Now codified as article 167, article
190-3 prohibits the purchase of shares in a public tender offer by any person possessing inside
information. SEL, art. 167, reprinted in SEL & FSFL, supra note 21, at 109-12.
78. See INSIDER TRADING: THE LAWS OF EURoPE, THE UNITED STATE AND JAPAN, supra note 4.
79. Supra note 73.
80. The reinstatement of the disclosure requirement of former article 188 at article 154, which is
now codified at article 163, allowed the Ministry of Finance to monitor short-swing activity by
corporate insiders. SEL, art. 163, reprinted in SEL & FSFL, supra note 21, at 103-04. Articles 166 and
167 formerly articles 190-2 and 190-3, were introduced in order to define insider trading and provide
a provision under which to punish the activity. SEL, arts. 166, 167, reprinted in SEL & FSFL, supra
note 21, at 106-112. However, the new Japanese insider law sets relatively light penalties. While the
maximum U.S. criminal penalties are 10 years imprisonment and a one million dollar fine, a violation
of the Japanese law only results in six months imprisonment and a 500,000 yen fine. SEL, art. 200,
reprinted in SEL & FSFL, supra note 21, at 124-26.
81. The 1988 Amendments produced a significant amount of commentary in the American legal
community. See, e.g., Harold Baum, Japanese Capital Markets: New Legislation, 22 L. JAPAN 1 (1989);
Akashi, supra note 70; Lu, supra note 24; Laura Merkler, Comment, Japanese Securities Regulations,
3 TEMPLE INT'L & Comp. L. J. 75 (1989); Swan supra note 74. Japanese authorities were embarrassed
when the first prosecution under the new law was initiated not by the Ministry of Finance or the Tokyo
Stock Exchange (who had already investigated and declared the defendants innocent), but by the police.
Watam Horiguchi, Securities Malfeasance in Japan: The Need for an Independent Organization to
Monitor Insider Trading, Price Manipulation, and Loss Compensation, 16 HAsrINGS INT'L & COMP.
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ment of civil liability under both the new articles and the anti-fraud
provision was ignored.
III. PRIVATE RIGHTS AND THE ROLE OF LAW IN JAPAN
Whereas private citizens play an important role in the enforcement of
laws in the United States, the rate of private litigation in Japan is
significantly lower.8 2 Some scholars argue that private action is limited by
an innate Japanese cultural aversion to litigation. 3 While this argument
may have some merit, others argue that Japanese history has actually
produced a bureaucratic monopolization of enforcement.' Most often,
enforcement is conducted by the powerful Japanese ministries as part of the
overall policy mechanism of administrative guidance.8 5 This system has
yielded few incentives for private parties to seek redress. Moreover,
structural barriers to litigation are common. 6 When such barriers are
removed and incentives are provided, the Japanese citizen may be as likely
to seek judicial remedies as any American.
A. Japan's Bureaucracy
Professors Hideo Tanaka 7 and Akio Takeuchi"8 provide a valuable
L. REv. 223, 224-25 (1993). The Tokyo Summary Court eventually fined the president of a finance
company 200,000 yen for violating Article 190-2. Id.
82. For a detailed comparison of litigation rates in the United States and Japan, see Masanobu
Koto, The Role of Law and Lawyers in Japan and the United States, 1987 B.Y.U. L. REV. 627 (1987)
(also comparing attitudes toward judges and lawyers, pay scales, and other areas).
83. The foremost proponent of this theory is Professor Takeyoshi Kawashima. TAKEYOSHI
KAWASH1MA, THE LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE JAPANESE (1967). See also Takeyoshi Kawashima,
Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN 41-72 (A.T. Von Mehren, ed. 1963).
Kawashima argues that the Japanese prefer reconciliation over litigation as a form of dispute resolution
because the latter disrupts the communal harmony so valued by the Japanese. Id. at 45. He notes that
"resort to litigation has been condemned as morally wrong, subversive and rebellious." Id. Another
prominent Japanese scholar, Professor Noda, follows this cultural argument, claiming that Japanese
homogeneity, village-bent behavior, and lack of norm consciousness lead to a desire for conciliation
over adjudication. Yosiyuki Noda, The Character of the Japanese People and Their Conception of Law,
in THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 295-3 10 (H. Tanaka, ed. 1976).
84. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
87. Professor Hideo Tanaka, a Japanese scholar of comparative law, authored works in both
English and Japanese. See 24 L. JAPAN vii (1991) (dedicating the volume to the late Tanaka).
88. Professor Akio Takeuchi is a leading scholar of Japanese corporate law. See West, infra note
112.
1995] 1411
Washington University Open Scholarship
1412 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 73:1399
study on the role of private actions in Japan.89 In their article, they
analyze a basic difference between the historical development of Japanese
and American law.90 While American law developed largely as a means
of solving disputes between citizens, Japanese law was created in response
to the West and has traditionally been implemented as a means for the
rulers to rule.91 As the drafters of over ninety percent of all legislation and
the primary enforcers of that legislation, the bureaucrats seem to have
inherited the power to rule.92
In Japan, the bureaucrats within the government ministries are respected
as the elite of the country.93 Most are graduates of the Law Faculty of
Tokyo University, the nation's most prestigious school.94 In many ways,
it is the bureaucrats, not the elected politicians, who are responsible for
guiding the policies of Japan.95 One consequence is that the bureaucrats
are often reluctant to allow others, especially the public at large, to affect
89. Hideo Tanaka & Akio Takeuchi, The Role of Private Persons in the Enforcement of Law: A
Comparative Study of Japanese and American Law, 7 L. JAPAN 34 (1974).
90. Id. at 37-39.
91. Id. Dutch author and journalist Karel van Wolferen supports this view of the role of law in
Japan. KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER, 202-12 (1989). Like Tanaka and
Takeuchi, van Wolferen contrasts the historical development of law in Japan and the West, concluding,
that "fo]n the whole, Japanese still think of law as an instrument of constraint used by the government
to impose its will. Japanese officials are free to pick and choose among laws, using them to further their
own causes." Id. at 210.
92. A study by Professor T.J. Pempel shows that bureaucrats have dominated the drafting of
legislation since the end of the second world war. T.J. Pempel, The Bureaucratization of Policymaking
in Postwar Japan, 18 AM. J. POL. ScI. 647 (1974). Analysts argue that Japanese politicians who gain
votes by providing favors to their constituents, are too concerned with politics to delve into policy
issues. See, e.g., Teresa Watanabe, Tumult at the Top: Who Really Runs Japan?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 26,
1994, at Al. For an opposing view, see GERALD L. CURTIS, THE JAPANESE VAY OF POLITIcs (1988)
(arguing that bureaucrats no longer dominate, and that politicians now share in the policymaking
process). According to Curtis, the breakdown of a national consensus toward growth of Japan's gross
national product and the liberalization of the economy have forced political involvement. Id. at 109-10.
93. See Milhaupt, supra note 8.
94. Johnson details the prevalence of Tokyo graduates within the ministries, noting that they tend
to maintain their college ties. JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 57-61.
95. Professor Chalmers Johnson is perhaps the most famous proponent of the bureaucratic
dominance model of Japanese government. See JOHNSON, supra note 12. Other scholars have taken a
more moderate view which recognizes the importance of private party input into the policy making
process. See Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 424-26. Curtis argues that power is actually shared by
bureaucrats and politicians. CURTIs, supra note 92, at I 1l. Professor Kent Calder favors an approach
that relies on a "hybrid public private system" which also recognizes the growing role of politicians in
the policy making process. KENT E. CALDER, STRATEGIC CAPITALISM: PRIVATE BUSINESS AND PUBLIC
PURPOSE IN JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL FINANCE (1993).
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policy.96 The development of close relationships between bureaucrats and
the private parties they govern is also a source of concern to small
investors.
97
The preferred operational method for Japanese bureaucrats is administra-
tive guidance. This extra-legal process allows each ministry to guide policy
flexibly by informally offering advice, warnings, and information to parties
within its purview." Overall, this method has proven very successful for
Japanese industry." One problem with administrative guidance is that
enforcement of laws is often carried on behind closed doors and thus is not
subject to public scrutiny."° Another problem is that laws are often not
96. Johnson characterizes the ministries as constantly trying to defend their interests by holding
on to or expanding upon the power they possess. JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 74. Van Wolferen goes
further, arguing that the bureaucrats maintain a monopoly on the law:
The professors of the law department of the University of Tokyo, the nearly exclusive
breeding ground for top administrators, appear to view the law as essentially an aid to
administration. They still blindly accept the centuries-old premiss that the government is
automatically superior to the people, believing that 'by nature, the people cannot understand
the political realm and therefore should not criticize the administration's policies.' Conversely,
laws are deemed legitimate by the populace only because they are administered by a class of
people who have always had the right to do so, and not because they conform to any popular
sense of justice.
VAN WOLFEREN, supra note 91, at 211.
97. One relationship-cultivating mechanism is "amakudari." Literally meaning descent from
heaven, amakudari involves the hiring of retired ministers by private businesses within the former
minister's jurisdiction. "The most senior amakudari position ... are bases from which to coordinate the
strategic sectors. At this level the Western distinction between public and private loses meaning."
JOHNSON supra note 12, at 71. The Minstry of Finance's close relationship with those it regulates is
also evidenced in the methods it employs to research and draft legislation. The Wall Street Journal
reports that when the MOF was designing its insider trading laws in 1988, its officials requested help
from Japan's big four securities houses in researching the laws of other nations. Marcus W. Brauchli,
Swamped Agency: As Japan's Economy Gains Clout, Ministry of Finance Struggles, WALL ST. J., Dec.
20, 1989. One firm, Daiwa, reportedly spent tens of thousands of dollars to hire a Wall Street law firm
to research U.S. provisions. Id.
98. Johnson, supra note 12, at 265.
99. Much has been written on the Japanese use of administrative guidance. See, e.g., John 0.
Haley, Administrative Guidance Versus Formal Regulation: Resolving the Paradox oflndustrial Policy,
in LAW AND TRADE ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY, 107-28 (Gary Saxonhouse & Kozo
Yamamura, eds., 1986) (arguing that, as an essentially weak means of enforcing policy, administrative
guidance has allowed firms to avoid more restrictive policies and helped to enhance competition in
Japan, not suppress it); JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 242-74 (detailing the development and employment
of administrative guidance within the Ministry of International Trade and Industry); Yoriaki Narita,
Administrative Guidance, 2 L. JAPAN 45 (James L. Anderson trans., 1968) (defining administrative
guidance and describing its strengths and weaknesses as an alternative to formal regulation in Japan).
100. Administrative guidance is also traditionally immune to judicial review. See, e.g., FRANK
UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN, 198-202 (1987).
Washington University Open Scholarship
1414 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 73:1399
enforced at all."0' A ministry responsible for the promotion of firms
within that industry may be hesitant to seek official sanctions against those
firms for wrongdoing when informal actions may suffice.
Within the hierarchy of the Japanese bureaucracy, the Ministry of
Finance stands alone at the top."° Its wide-ranging powers and control
over the national budget ensure its dominance. 3 As the elite among
Japan's elite, the Ministry of Finance displays many of the strengths and
flaws for which the bureaucracy is famous. Among the problems are the
close relationships between Ministry of Finance bureaucrats and private
industry leaders," a reliance on informal methods of regulation, 0 5 and
a stubborn reluctance to relinquish its role as the sole overseer of the varied
industries it regulates.'0 6
B. Structural Barriers to Litigation
It is often said that Japan is an inherently non-litigious society due to its
harmonious and homogeneous culture.' 7 Under this analysis, a private
right of action is not as important in Japan, because mediation is the
preferred method of dispute resolution.'08 However, this idea of an
innately non-litigious Japanese character has come under significant
101. The recent Administrative Procedure Law addressed the potential for abuse under
administrative guidance, although many of its provisions are simply hortatory in nature. Administrative
Procedure Law, Law No. 88 of 1993.
102. See Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 444. Ministry of Finance predominance stems from its broad
range of powers, which includes oversight of the national budget and the banking, securities, and
insurance industries. One problem is that the Ministry of Finance has tended to focus its financial
regulation on the banking industry. Id. at 440-49. Ministry of Finance's overwhelming dominance in
policymaking has led to calls for its disempowerment and even its dissolution. See, e.g., Shigeki
Kakinuma & Hiroshi Fukunaga, Yes, We're Serious-BREAK UP the Ministry ofFinance, TOKYO Bus.
TODAY, Jan. 1995, § I at 6, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Tokbus file.
103. See Takao Toshikawa, Inside the MOF The Men from the Ministry, TOKYO Bus. TODAY, Jan.
1995, § 2, at 13, available in LEXIS, News Library, Tokbus File (showing the prominence of the
Budget Bureau within the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Finance's domination of Japan's less
powerful ministries).
104. Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 426. "Informality and cooperation, born partly of historical accident,
have dominated securities regulation in Japan both because they serve important economic and political




107. See KAWASHMA, supra note 83.
108. Id. at 50.
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attack."° Some argue that the dearth of litigation is more closely related
to institutional barriers to litigation."' Examples of such barriers include
the lack of provisions for class actions,"' the absence of effective
discovery procedures," 2 and the incredibly expensive litigation fees
required to file a civil action." 3
Recent developments in the area of financial regulation support the
theory that Japanese citizens would pursue litigation if it were economically
feasible. For example, until very recently shareholder derivative litigation
was extremely rare."4 Traditionalists attributed this to the famed Japanese
cultural preference for harmony and aversion to litigation.' Others cited
109. See John 0. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE STUD. 359 (1978)
(countering that members of most societies have an aversion to litigation, and that the relative lack of
litigation in Japan is more attributable to inadequate judicial relief and access to the courts than to any
inherent cultural aversion); J. Mark Ramseyer & Minom Nakazoto, The Rational Litigant: Settlement
Amounts and Verdict Rates in Japan, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 263 (1989) (employing a wealth maximizing
model in claiming that the Japanese are actually rational players who have little reason to sue in Japan's
more predictable legal system).
110. See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust Enforcement and
Institutional Barriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604 (1985). Ramseyer studied Japanese
antitrust law and concluded that institutional barriers to litigation have eliminated private antitrust suits
and removed any meaningful deterrent to price-fixing. Id. These kinds of barriers help to preserve the
myth of the non-litigious Japanese society. Id. at 605.
111. Tanaka & Takeuchi, supra note 89, at 44.
112. Actions in Japan are judge centered, and there is not system of pre-trial discovery. Mark D.
West, The Pricing of Shareholder Derivative Actions in Japan and the United States, 88 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1436 (1994).
113. Some have chosen to follow a middle of the road approach, noting the existence of some
cultural aversions to litigation, but also recognizing barriers such as the small number of lawyers and
poor access to courts. See, e.g., Koto, supra note 82; Hideo Tanaka, The Role of Law in Japanese
Society: Comparisons with the West, 19 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REv. 375 (1985).
114. The mechanisms for shareholder derivative litigation were instituted after World War II and
are very similar to U.S. regulations. For a complete background of derivative actions in Japan and an
analysis of the recent litigation explosion, see West, supra note 112 (arguing that limited economic
incentives prevented shareholders from filing claims until the recent changes in the Commercial Code
made such actions profitable).
115. See KAWASHIMA supra note 83. West reports that even those with less traditional views
subscribe to this theory when derivative suits are involved:
Although in his writings Professor Akio Takeuchi, Japan's preeminent company law scholar,
usually attaches some degree of significance to institutional barriers to litigation, when pressed
during a roundtable discussion, he remarked that, derivative litigation has been sparse chiefly
because of "the most typical feature of Japanese society - the distaste for litigation."
West, supra note 112, at 1440-41 (quoting Roundtable, The Present State of and Problems Relating to
the Preliminary Draft of the Commercial Code Revision, 1133 SHon HoMu (Commercial Law Journal)
8, 23 (1988) (statement of Akio Takeuchi)).
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economic barriers such as litigation fees.' 1 6 In 1993, following American
pressure 17 and a rare case of judicial activism,"' the Ministry of Jus-
tice instituted a flat litigation fee of 8,200 thousand yen (approximately
eighty-two dollars) for those filing derivative actions." 9 The result, as
expected by fearful corporate directors, was a flood of shareholder
derivative suits. 20
IV. THE SECURITIES FAIRNESS ACT OF 1992
The loss compensation scandals of 1991 involved all of Japan's major
securities firms and drew worldwide attention to the nation's troubled
securities industry.'2' In response to mounting foreign and domestic
pressure,'" the Diet, Japan's legislative body, amended the SEL once
116. The filing fee for compensation claims was about 0.5% of the claim itself. "Though ostensibly
for the purpose of preventing strike suits, the actual effect of the pre-1993 litigation fee rules was to
discourage meritorious suits." West, supra note 112, at 1463. West also cites other economic barriers,
such as high attorneys fees, limited access to information, and Japan's abuse of rights doctrine. Id. at
1456-70.
117. The frustration expressed by Texas entrepreneur T. Boone Pickens after buying shares in a
Koito, a Japanese corporation, was widely publicized. This led the United States government to demand
changes in the Japanese corporate structure during the Strategic Impediments Initiative of 1990. For an
analysis of the Pickens affair, see M. Evan Corcoran; Note, Foreign Investment and Corporate Control
in Japan: T. Boone Pickens and Acquiring Control Through Share Ownership, 22 L. & POL'Y INT'L
BUS. 333, 350-54 (1991).
118. West supra note 112, at 1497 (citing Judgement of Aug. 11, 1992 (Asai v. Iwasaki [hereinafter
the Nikko Securities Case]), Tokyo District Court, 101 Shiryoban Shoji Homu 37, rev'd, Judgement of
Mar. 30, 1993, Tokyo High Court, 109 Shiryoban Shoji Homu 70). In the Nikko Securities Case, the
Tokyo High Court ruled that because damages in derivative actions are indeterminable, litigation fees
should be set at 8,200 yen (about $82). If the court had based the fees upon the damage claim, plaintiffs
would have had to pay 235 million yen instead (over two million dollars). Id. at 1464-65. The litigation
fee for other compensation claims remains at 0.5% of the claim.
119. Law to Revise Part of the Commercial Code, Law No. 62 of 1993. This amendment essentially
codified the judgement in the Nikko Securities Case. See West, supra note 112, at 1497.
120. Masayuki Tamura & Toyoki Sakata, Shareholders Turning to Lawsuits to Assure Executive
Accountability, NIKKEI WKLY., May 9, 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nikkei File.
121. See supra note 5.
122. United States Under Secretary of the Treasury David C. Mulford publicly criticized the
Ministry of Finance's anticompetitive and opaque regulatory regime after the 1991 scandals. James
Sterngold, Treasury Offlcial Rebukes Japan, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1991, at Dl. Former SEC Chairman
David Ruder joined the debate by advocating the establishment of an independent market watchdog.
Yas Idei, Independent Securities Watchdog Urged; Staff, Budget Among Keys, Says Former U.S.
Official, NIKKEI WKLY., Nov. 16, 1991, at 19, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nikkei File. Japanese
Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu also advocated a commission modeled after the American SEC. See
Hidetaka Tomomatsu & Yas Idei, Securities Watchdog: Hunter or Housepet, NIKKEI ,VKLY., Aug. 10,
1991, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nikkei File.
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more the following year."2 In addition to revising disclosure require-
ments, the Securities Fairness Law addressed the problem of insider trading
by establishing the SESC. 24
Despite calls for an independent regulatory body, the Ministry of Finance
chose to maintain a prominent role in capital markets by making the new
watchdog a part of the Ministry of Finance."z The SESC is composed of
approximately two hundred members drawn primarily from the Ministry of
Finance. 26 The Ministry of Finance also appoints the SESC's chairman
and two commissioners. 27 The SESC has the power to launch investiga-
tions of any parties suspected of wrongdoing and has the duty to report
such illegal activities to the Ministry of Finance.128
On the surface, the new agency appears to be a breakthrough in the
regulation of Japanese securities. The lack of a market watchdog had long
been criticized as the major stumbling block to a fair and efficient Japanese
market. 29 Indeed, the SESC has already launched investigations into
charges of insider trading and market manipulation. 30 One investigation
has even resulted in convictions for insider trading. 3' On further analysis,
however, one may conclude, as one critic has, that the SESC is "illustrative
of the Japanese genius for maintaining the status quo despite outward
manifestations of reform."' 32
Although the commission's small size is often cited as a major
123. Law No. 73 of 1992.
124. Law No. 73 of 1992. For an examination of the modified disclosure regulations as well as the
SESC, see Shen-Shin Lu, Securities Regulation in Japan: An Update, 22 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
121 (1993) (finding the Securities Fairness Act strict in appearance, but limited in practical effect).
125. See supra note 7-10.
126. See supra note 9.
127. Such appointments are subject to approval by the Diet. Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 470.
128. See supra note 9.
129. See e.g. Horiguchi, supra note 81; Ramsay, supra note 14, at 282-83; Yazawa, supra note 22,
at 26. See also supra note 122.
130. The SESC acted quickly. Shortly after its inception in 1992 it raided a company suspected of
market manipulation. SeeYo Makino & Akira Ikeya, Watchdog Raid Targets illicit Speculation, NIKKEI
WKiY., Dec. 14, 1992, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nikkei File. The SESC has also
investigated two cases of insider trading. See supra note 10. This has led to optimism on the part of
some observers. "[T]he vigor of the SESC's initial investigatory program suggests that SESC officials
perceive themselves to be independent, and this may be the most critical factor in ensuing proper
distance between the SESC and other [Ministry of Finance] organs." Milhaupt, supra note 8, at 475.
131. See supra note 10.
132. Lu, supra, note 124, at 129. This statement expresses one of the common criticisms leveled
at the Japanese government.
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shortcoming, 133 the biggest problem for the agency is its affiliation with
the Ministry of Finance. The SESC has no authority to levy administrative
punishments or even bring charges against a party it believes guilty.'34
Rather, it is confined to making recommendations to the Ministry of
Finance or asking the public prosecutor's office to bring charges.'35
Obviously, as the SESC's overseer, the Ministry of Finance has a voice in
whether such requests are made. Given the long-established bureaucratic
preference for extra-judicial means of regulation, the frequency of
prosecutions initiated by the Ministry of Finance should not rise significant-
ly.
The deterrent effect of the SESC on insider trading is dubious. Ultimate
control is still within the purview of the Ministry of Finance, and the
ministry's cozy relationship with the largest firms in the industry continues.
Fear that smaller players would become the sacrificial lambs appears to
have been born out by recent developments.'36 It seems that the major
firms in the Japanese securities market will encounter few problems from
the new watchdog unless they commit particularly egregious acts.
37
Because of the flaws in the 1992 Securities Fairness Law, Japan should
examine other forms of regulation.
133. See e.g. Masato Hotta, Securities Watchdog Chained by Limited Staff; Successes Evident, But
Much Still Left Undone, NIKKEI VKLY., Aug. 2, 1993, at 2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nikkei
File (referring to the SESC as "grossly understaffed" and possessing "insufficient resources to deal with
insider trading").
134. See supra note 9.
135. The SESC's enforcement powers are further limited by the fact that reporting a violation to
the prosecutor's office does not necessarily ensure prosecution. Prosecutors in Japan have a great deal
of discretion in determining whether to prosecute. See B.J. George, Discretionary Authority of Public
Prosecutors in Japan, in LAW AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 263-88 (John 0. Haley ed.,
1988) (arguing that a system of checks and balances on this discretion prevents abuse of it).
136. Because of the consensual nature of the relationship between the Ministry of Finance and the
industry, many feared that small players without such relations would be sacrificed to appease public
pressures. The first party convicted due to SESC action was labeled a "small fry operator" by one
foreign journalist who quoted sources as not expecting impartial action by the new watchdog. Michael
Hirsh, Japan: A Regulator's Dubious Debut, INSTTUTONAL INVESTOR, Jan. 1993, at 21.
137. The larger players have certainly been punished in the past. See supra note 5. However, this
seems to occur only when the acts are so blatant as to achieve notoriety from the public, politicians and
the international community. Further, even in instances such as the loss compensation scandal,
punishments have been incredibly lenient. See supra note 5.
The recent Nippon Shoji case involved the death of several consumers caused by a drug which the
company produced. See supra note 10. It is that information which caused the stocks of the company
to plummet and insiders to gain a windfall before public disclosure. Id. Such a flagrant abuse of inside
information had to be punished.
[VOL. 73:1399
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss3/32
1995] INSIDER TRADING IN JAPAN 1419
V. CREATING A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
The Tokyo stock market did not assume a truly international presence
until the 1980s.' During the inflation of Japan's bubble economy, 3 9
the value of shares traded on the market soared, realizing an increase of
over 400 trillion yen."° Throughout that growth and the subsequent
deflation, scandals involving politicians, 4' large companies, 142 and even
gangsters 143 repeatedly rocked the securities industry. The scandals have
been followed consistently by the Ministry of Finance's inability or
unwillingness to levy adequate punishments or prevent further mis-
deeds.'" Although some are optimistic about the inception and recent
activities of the SESC, responsibility for true reform should lie with another
group, as yet unempowered. Because the Ministry of Finance has proven
that it cannot be counted on to provide sufficient protection, Japanese and
foreign investors should be given the power to challenge abuses themselves.
Similar to most Japanese litigation, the current approach to the
prosecution of securities violations relies on criminal sanctions. 141
138. See supra note 57.
139. Tokyo's financial market experienced an unprecedented bull run during the 1980s. This was
partially fueled by overspeculation in land and stock prices. See David E. Sanger, Hard Landing in
Tokyo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1993, at § 7, 14. This speculative "bubble" burst in the early 1990s and
has led Japan into a deep recession. Id. For an account of this boom and bust, see CHRISTOPHER WOOD,
THE BUBBLE ECONOMY: JAPAN'S EXTRAORDINARY SPECULATIVE BOOM OF THE 80'S AND THE
DRAMATIC BUST OF THE 90's (1993).
140. Sterngold, supra note 24.
141. In perhaps Japan's most notorious scandal, the Recruit Company sold shares to politicians as
gifts shortly before the company went public. See Lu, supra note 124, at 149-50. The politicians,
including the sitting Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, made a handsome profit of over 730
million yen. Id. All resigned when the scandal broke, but two of the involved politicians were
subsequently elected to serve as Prime Minister. Id.
142. Nomura admitted that one of the preferred clients compensated for losses was a well-known
organized crime figure. Sterngold, supra note 24.
143. Some of the parties illegally compensated in the 1991 scandals included organized crime
figures. See supra note 5.
144. One critic referred to the punishments administered in relation to the 1991 compensation
scadals as "so inadequate as to be almost laughable." Hoppe, supra note 5, at 213.
145. Japanese securities regulation relies almost entirely on criminal sanctions to punish offenders.
A person convicted of insider trading under Article 157 formerly codified as Article 58, may be
punished by up to three years in prison and a three million yen fine, or both. SEL, art. 197, reprinted
in SEL & FSFL, supra note 21, at 121-22. Articles 166 and 167 introduced in 1988 as Articles 190-2
and 190-3, carry lesser penalties including a maximum of only six months imprisonment and not more
than a 500,000 yen fine (about $5,000), or both. SEL, art. 200, Id. at 124-26. There is no provision for
compensation for the injured investors. Furthermore, violations of the SEL rarely result in prison
sentences. Tradition holds that first time offenders receive probation. Lu, supra note 24, at 231.
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Usually, some form of induced "voluntary" retribution on the offender's
part is also involved. 46 The recent Nippon Shoji case' 47 showcases this
"correctional emphasis.' 48 Small fines were levied, most of which did
not approach the illegal earnings which were made.'49 This retribution
was accompanied by public apologies 50 and internal changes within the
companies of those convicted.15' Compensation for the victims of the
abuse was not even considered.
In the United States, the SEC may also seek criminal sanctions against
offenders of insider trading laws, 52 but fines are usually much larger 153
and the commission also relies upon the actions of private investors suing
under Rule 10b-5.' Private enforcement under Rule lOb-5 can result in
large damage awards against parties perpetrating fraud, 5 serving to both
deter potential abuses and reimburse injured parties.156 Further use of the
rule by private parties promotes efficient markets and boosts investor
confidence. Indeed, by its own admission, the SEC lacks the manpower and
budget to completely police the market by itself.
57
The Ministry of Finance has yet to concede such a fact. Even with a
watchdog that is a fraction of the size of the SEC, the Ministry refuses to
share its enforcement powers with investors. This is the main reason for the
146. The Japanese criminal justice system follows a paternalistic model based on the goals of
rehabilitation and reintegration of the suspect into society without incarceration. See Daniel H. Foote,
The Benevolent Paternalism of Japanese Criminal Justice, 80 CAL. L. REV. 317 (1992). Within this
system, acceptance of moral responsibility carries great weight in the sentencing process. Id. at 352.
147. See 24 Fined, supra note 10.
148. The term "correctional emphasis" is used by Professor Haley to refer to the Japanese goal of
having guilty parties express regret to pay for their crimes. John 0. Haley, Introduction: Legal v. Social
Controls, in LAW AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN, supra note 135, at 2. Expressions of regret
are usually preferred to the imposition of prison sentences. Id.
149. The maximum penalty for violation of Article 166 is 500,000 yen (about $5,000). SEL, art.
200, reprinted in SEL & FSFL, supra note 21, at 124-26. One party involved in the Nippon Shoji case
allegedly earned four million yen. See Briefing, DALLAS MORNING Naws, Oct. 15, 1994, at 5F.
150. See 24 Fined, supra note 10.
151. The President of Nippon Shoji resigned shortly after the investigation was launched. See 32
Charged for Insider Trading of Drugmaker Shares, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWiRE, Oct. 14, 1994, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US File.
152. See supra note 73.
153. See supra note 73.
154. 5 JACOBS, supra note 29, § 8.01, at 1-228,29.
155. See supra note 73.
156. One writer's economic analysis of insider trading constraints shows that U.S. case law has
been much more effective in deterring violations than regulations or administrative acts. H. Nejat
Seyhun, The Effectiveness of Insider Trading Sanctions, 35 J. L. & ECON. 149 (1992).
157. 5 JACOBS, supra note 29, § 8.01, at 1-228.
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continued scandals. The Ministry of Finance's refusal to share enforcement
powers has also arguably contributed to the drastic decline in value of
shares listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.5 8 A private right of action
would help to reverse these trends.
A. Implementation by Litigation
One group that could play a role in initiating a private right for insider
trading is private attorneys. After all, it was "the ingenuity of members of
the private bar" which developed civil liability under Rule 1Ob-5 in the
United States.' Although Japan has traditionally had few attorneys
specializing in securities,"6° protection of small investors is becoming
more popular. 6 ' The plaintiff in Kardon'62 recovered under the theory
that congressional intent provided for private recovery under the Exchange
Act. "'63 No legislative intent accompanied the SEL in Japan, but a private
right could be developed under a tort theory similar to that cited in
Kardon.'64
Article 709 of the Japanese Civil Code161 provides that "a person who
has intentionally or negligently violated the right of another is bound to
compensate any damages resulting in consequence."' 66 The Code further
defines an unlawful act as that "which violates the right of another and
158, Sterngold, supra note 24. From the end of 1989 until April of 1992, the market's value
declined by fifty percent. Id.
159. Milton Freeman, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. LAW.
793, 922 (1967). Mr. Freeman was an employee of the SEC and a drafter of Rule lOb-5. He admitted
that nobody involved with its implementation foresaw its use in private litigation. Id.
160. As West argues, this is due largely to the limited number of private attorneys and lower
economic incentives to litigate securities cases in Japan. See West, supra note 112, at 1458-63.
161. Lawyers supporting free markets are beginning to question the Ministry of Finance's
monopolization of enforcement. See Kathryn Graven & Marcus W. Brauchli, Shareholder Rights Idea
Grows in Japan, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 1989, § 1, at 6. Presumably, they are also becoming aware of
the high awards available, at least in derivative suits.
162. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
163 Id. at 514. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
164. 69 F. Supp. at 513. Although Kardon's logic provides the basis for private rights of action
under Rule 1Ob-5, former SEC Chairman Joseph Grundfest finds a gap in the logic. Joseph A.
Grundfest, Disemploying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The
Commission's Authority, 107 HARv. L. REV. 961 (1994) (urging the SEC to become involved in the
current debate over the existence of a private right under Rule lOb-5). Grundfest claims that under
current Supreme Court doctrine, Kardon was incorrect and should not be used to support a private right
under Rule lOb-5. Id. at 989-91.
165. Minpo, (Civil Code), Law No. 89 of 1896 and Law No. 9 of 1898, Art. 709, translated in J.E.
DE BECKER, ANNOTATED CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN 273-74 (1979).
166. Id.
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inflicts damage upon him."'67 The Ministry of Finance has declared
article 157 of the SEL too vague to apply to insider trading, but articles
166 and 167, instituted in 1988 as articles 190-2 and 190-3, may provide
recourse. 68 These laws specifically target insider trading. 6 9 Any viola-
tion of these provisions should, therefore, result in compensation awarded
to the victim.1
70
In theory, this may seem simple, but there are other factors with which
to contend. Any tort action places the burden of proof on the plaintiff, and
Japan's discovery procedures make proving a violation of insider trading
laws extremely difficult. The best opportunity would seem to arise after the
trial of a related criminal case. For instance, if private investors were to file
a claim against the recently convicted members of Nippon Shoji, 17' the
burden of proving a violation would be much lighter for the private
plaintiff. This consequence is not totally satisfactory to injured investors,
as it means further reliance on the Ministry of Finance or, at least, on the
SESC. However, the threat of civil liability will result in some deterrence
of illegal acts, benefitting investors as a whole.
Excessively high litigation fees also pose a problem for potential
litigants.' While the Ministry of Justice revised the amount required for
derivative suits, litigation fees for other actions remain high.'73 However,
this may also be challenged. The 1993 revision of litigation fees in
derivative suits actually stenmed from the Nikko Securities Case,17 in
which the Tokyo High Court overruled a lower court decision and ruled
that a flat rate is applicable in shareholder derivative actions.' 7 Insider
trading litigants could request a similar fee schedule.
Private attorneys would also have to rely on an activist judiciary.
167. Id. at 272.
168. See supra note 77.
169. SEL, arts. 166, 167, reprinted in SEL & FSFL, supra note 21, at 106-112. See also supra note
77.
170. Victims of insider trading could also conceivably bring actions against the employers of those
perpetrating illegal acts. Civil Code, art. 715, translated in DE BECKER, supra note 165, at 281. Article
715 of the Civil Code provides in pertinent part: "A person who has employed another for a certain
business is bound to make compensation for any damages caused to a third party by the person
employed in the execution thereof,... " Id. This provision has also yet to be used in securities actions.
Attorneys would thus run into the same problems as those attempting to invoke article 709.
171. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 116.
173. See supra note 118.
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Unfortunately, the Japanese bench does not have a long history of making
independent decisions.'76 Despite receiving criticism for not straying from
the status quo, some Japanese courts have nevertheless made controversial
decisions in the past.' The Nikko Securities Case is one such recent
example.'78 Other courts could follow the same activist approach,
especially if they are influenced by the current widespread discontent with
the securities industry.
B. Pressuring the Ministry of Finance
If private litigants do not act or are not successful in pursuing a private
right of action, direct action by the Ministry of Finance be another means
of change. Based upon that Ministry's historic intransigence to relinquish-
ing enforcement power,179 this proposition seems untenable. However, the
recent developments in shareholder derivative' and products liability
regulation' indicate that bureaucrats could possibly relinquish their
enforcement power. Evidence suggests that either acute pressure on the
Ministry, or the persuasion of its leadership as to the benefits of private
enforcement is needed to bring about such a reversal. 2 If popular
176. Elliott Hahn attributes this partially to the fundamental differences between common and civil
law systems:
Acting under the civil law traditions of Japan, the judge will simply call the attention of the
public to the specific statute which he is invoking as authority. In contrast, under the common
law system the judge enjoys more free-wheeling powers .... Often an American judge will
issue an opinion changing the law because he sees the court as the vehicle to do so; rarely,
if ever, will a Japanese judge so view the court. In fact, an analysis of Japanese opinions leads
one to believe that many Japanese judges see their roles as guardians of the values of Japan
that have guided that country for hundreds of years.
ELLIOTT J. HAHN, JAPANESE BusINEss LAW AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 22 (1984).
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth find different reasons for the alleged judicial inactivism. J. MARK
RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN'S POLITICAL MARKETPLACE (1993). They define
the relationship between judges and the politicians that appoint them as one of agent and principal. Id.
at 142-82. Political leaders use direct control over their appointments and indirect control over the
Secretariat (the judiciary's administrative body) to affect judicial decisions. Id.
177. See West, supra note 112, at 1497 (citing Judgment of Aug. 11, 1992) and accompanying text.
See also infra note 196 and accompanying text.
178, West, supra note 112.
179. Recent evidence of this is the Ministry of Finance's refusal to allow an independent securities
watchdog. See supra note 96.
180. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
181. See infra notes 191-200 and accompanying text.
182. Although the effect of public and political pressure on financial policymaking is less significant
in Japan than other nations, interest groups have enjoyed some success since the 1970s. See CALDER,
supra note 95, at 232-37. The most obvious response to a public outcry was the Securities Fairness Act.
Law No. 73 of 1992.
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frustration with the securities industry does not abate, more changes could
be forthcoming.
Revisiting the 1993 amendments to the Commercial Code, 83 one may
see that a variety of pressures produced significant changes in the law.'84
The first was the Strategic Impediments Initiative,'85 through which the
United States pressured Japan to amend its policies affecting shareholders.
A second force was the public outrage over rampant scandalous activity
within the securities industry."6 A third type of pressure was the increase
in shareholder litigation,8 7 including the Nikko Securities Case, in which
crafty private attorneys and an activist court found a loophole in the
otherwise prohibitive litigation fees.' These factors led to the Ministry
of Justice's revision of the Code,8 9 which has allowed further sharehold-
er litigation, and arguably improved corporate responsibility. 9
Product liability litigation was also very limited until recently. 9'
Plaintiffs attempting to sue for injuries caused by defective products faced
an almost insurmountable burden of proof.92 Finally, in 1993, worldwide
changes in products liability laws, 93 consumer frustration,'94 and anoth-
183. Law No. 62 of 1993.
184. See infra notes 185-90 and accompanying text.
185. JoINT REPORT OF THE U.S. - JAPAN WoRKING GROUP ON THE STRATEGIC IMPEDIMENTS
INITIATIVE, Introduction (June 28, 1990).
186. See Sterngold, supra note 24.
187. See Tamura & Sakata, supra note 120.
188. See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
189. Law No. 62 of 1993.
190. It has at least induced corporate directors to seek liability insurance in large numbers. See
Katsuhide Takahashi, More Companies Exploring Directors Liability Insurance, NIKKEI WKLY., Feb.
7, 1994, at 17, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nikkei File.
191. See Zentaro Kitagawa, Products Liability, in 7 DOING BUsINESS IN JAPAN § 4.01 (Zentaro
Kitagawa ed., 1989).
192. Before 1994, plaintiffs usually sued in tort under article 709 of the Civil Code. See supra notes
165-70 and accompanying text. Plaintiffs had difficulty proving both negligence and causation under
the Civil Code's provision. See Yasuhiro Fujita, Japan, in 1 PRODUCTS LIABILITY: A MANUAL OF
PRACTICE 1, 16-17 (W. Freedman ed., 1987).
193. The Council of the European Community sought to create uniform products liability laws
within Europe by issuing a directive. Council Directive 85/374 of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation
of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for
Defective Products [Directive], 1985 OJ. (L210) P29 [hereinafter EC Directive]. This directive called
for the protection of consumers through strict liability laws. Id. at Article 1.
194. In recent years, a number of consumer groups have advocated many changes in Japanese law.
See Nobuyuki Oishi, Consumer Groups: Advocates of V/at?, NIKKEI WKLY., Aug. 23, 1993, at 2,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Nikkei File. Former Prime Minister Hosokawa pledged to change
Japan from a producer to a consumer oriented society. Id.
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er case of judicial activism19 in Japan led the Ministry of Justice to
reexamine a proposal which had been shelved for twenty years.' 96 When
a committee appointed by Prime Minister Hosokawa advocated passage of
the law,'97 the Ministry of Justice finally relented. The new products
liability law 9' removes the need for the plaintiff to prove negligence by
the defendant."9 It provides, in effect, a strict liability theory of recov-
ery.20
These recent events in shareholder derivative and products liability laws
suggest that the ministries can be nudged toward enacting changes that they
initially opposed. Some combination of foreign, judicial, public or political
pressure2°' could arguably induce the Ministry of Finance to legitimate
a private right under either article 157 or articles 166 and 167. As the self-
proclaimed guarantors of Japan's well-being, 2 the bureaucrats do have
an interest in securing the most fair and efficient market possible. 3 They
must therefore be convinced to elevate market concerns above their
195. In March of 1994, the Osaka District Court ruled that negligence must be assumed in the case
of an injury caused by a defective product during normal use of that product. See Japan: Product
Liability Ruling Saddles Makers with Burden of Proof, NIKKE I WKLY., Apr. 4, 1994, at 20, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Nikkei File. A television set manufactured by the defendant exploded, causing
injuries to the plaintiff. Id. In essence, the court imposed a strict liability standard upon the defendant,
Matsushita Electronics. Id.
196 A model law of products liability was drafted in 1975 in response to several mass tort
incidents during that era. See Fujita, supra note 192, at 2.
197 Hosokawa was elected Prime Minister of Japan in 1993 on a pro-consumer platform. After his
election, he continued the push for reform by advocating a new products liability law. See, e.g., Mihoko
lida, Hosokawa Cabinet OKs Landmark Product Liability Bill, NIKKEI WKLY., Apr. 18, 1994, at 7,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Nikkei File.
198. Seizobutsu Sekinin Ho [Product Liability Law], Law No. 85 of 1994.
199. Law No. 85 of 1994, art. 3.
200, Id.
201. Lu argues that Diet intervention is unlikely, because corporate leaders rely on insider trading
as a way to bribe politicians. Lu, supra note 124, at 149-51. "It is a reasonable conclusion that Japanese
politicians do not intend to ban insider trading. They have left seams in the net in order to allow the
astute to pass through." Id. at 151. Lu's assertion is supported by Rosenbluth, who cites "several pieces
of circumstantial evidence of this activity. Politicians, for example, have consistently refused to tax
capital gains, and support freedom for stock owners not to register. Thus there is no way to trail stock
ownership," Frances Rosenbluth, The Political Economy of Financial Reform in Japan: The Banking
Act of 1982, 6 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 62, 67 (1989).
202. Johnson reports that bureaucrats "claim to be above politics and speak only of the national
interest." JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 52.
203. The 1988 amendments to the SEL were drafted after four consecutive years of declining
foreign investment in Japanese stocks. The market responded positively to the new laws. Eduardo Recio,
Comment, Shareholders Rights in Japan, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 489, 515 (1992) (advocating and
accurately predicting an increase in shareholder rights in Japan).
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relationships with larger firms in the industry.2 4
C. The Ministry of Justice
Finally, it is not inconceivable that the Ministry of Justice °5 could
intervene on behalf of investors by amending the Commercial Code or
choosing to enforce article 157, the equivalent of old article 58, on its
own. 6 The Ministry of Justice is susceptible to the same pressures as the
Ministry of Finance but is not constrained by the same relationships within
the securities industry. 7 In fact, the Ministry of Justice distributed
questionnaires addressing insider trading in the 1970s.2 8 The results
indicated that most respondents favored a provision that reinforced insider
trading regulations and transferred old articles 58 and 189 to the Commer-
cial Code.2 9 That the Ministry of Justice was considering such bold
action long before the recent scandals is encouraging to those seeking
change in the current regulatory regime.
Floating a questionnaire and actually intervening in the Ministry of
Finance's affairs are of course two different actions. The more powerful
Ministry of Finance would resist such a maneuver, viewing it as a threat to
its autonomy.2 0 However, the Ministry of Justice successfully implement-
ed the reduction of derivative litigation fees, an act which certainly affected
the Ministry of Finance's internal affairs.
204. Curtis argues that it is not intransigence but painfully slow decision making that often keeps
bureaucrats from enacting change:
Foreign pressure is often effective in getting the Japanese government to make a policy
decision, not because Japanese are peculiarly responsive to threats and hectoring ... but
because it drives issues into the political arena and thus brings into play the view of political
leaders attuned to the game of deal making, compromise and getting things done.
CURTIS, supra note 92, at 247.
205. The Ministry of Justice basically serves as legal counsel for the state. TAKAAKI HATrORI &
DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN, § 2.06, 2-35-38 (1985).
206. The Ministry of Justice includes a litigation division which is empowered to represent public
interests in actions before the courts. Id.
207. The MOJ may also supervise other ministries in the handling of suits in which that ministry
is a party. Id. Presumably, it could thus direct the MOF to pursue actions under chosen articles of the
Securities and Exchange Law.
208. Ishizumi, supra note 34, at 492.
209. Id.
210. Johnson claims that the bureaucrats are constantly waging turf battles. See JOHNsON, supra
note 12. "The greatest threat to a bureaucrat's security comes not from the political world.., but from
other bureaucrats." Id. at 321.
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VI. CONCLUSION
For almost fifty years, private rights of action have played a major role
in the regulation of insider trading in the United States. In Japan, a number
of factors have combined to prevent such a right of action. Thus far, the
Ministry of Finance, left virtually alone to police the market, has been
inadequate in preventing and deterring insider trading. While culturalists
will continue to argue that a private right of action would be wasted on the
non-litigious Japanese people, other evidence suggests that aggrieved
investors are quite willing to file suits when avenues to litigation are made
economically viable.
Japan has responded to scandals and the subsequent calls for reform of
the securities industry by introducing the SESC. Understaffed and under the
aegis of the Ministry of Finance, the SESC appears determined but limited.
Unfortunately, even an independent market watchdog could not solve the
problems of Japan's securities industry by itself. The goals of investor
confidence, efficient markets, compensation of injured parties, and criminal
deterrence require the inclusion of private parties in the regulatory process.
George F. Parker
14271995]
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss3/32
